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Changes in taxation of corporate dividends offer excellent opportunities to study dividend clientele effects. 
We explore payout policies and ownership structures around a major tax reform that took place in Finland 
in 2004. Consistent with dividend clienteles affecting firms’ dividend policy decisions, we find that Finnish 
firms altered their dividend policies based on the changed tax incentives of their largest shareholders. While 
firms adjust their payout policies, our results also indicate that ownership structures of Finnish firms also 
changed around the 2004 reform, consistent with shareholder clienteles adjusting to the new tax system. 
KEYWORDS: tax reform, dividends, share repurchases, ownership clienteles 
JEL Classification 
1. Introduction 
Despite more than 40 years of studies of corporate dividend policies, questions such as 
whether potential dividend clienteles affect corporate payout decisions are largely 
unanswered. Even the existence of dividend clienteles remains unclear. Most of early 
research has focused on price and volume reactions around dividend events. Those 
studies explore permanent dividend clienteles indirectly, and their results are mixed. In 
more recent work, dividend clienteles are observed more directly by studying the 
holdings of either institutional investors (Dhaliwal et al., 1999; Grinstein and Michaely, 
2005), retail investors (Graham and Kumar, 2006), or half of an entire market as in 
Dahlquist et al (2006). But do firms take the tax status of their owners into account, or is 
it mainly investors who make their portfolio choices based on firms’ existing dividend 
policies? Pérez-Gonzales (2003) argues that tax preferences of large shareholders 
influence dividend payout policies in the U.S. Findings by Chetty and Saez (2005), 
Blouin, et al. (2007), and Brown et al (2007) suggest that incentives of owners and 
managers affect firms’ payout policy decisions around tax reforms. Jin (2006) finds that 
embedded capital gains of institutional holders of the firm affect its choice between share 
repurchases and dividends. In contrast, survey evidence by Brav, et al. (2005) strongly 
indicates that firms are reluctant to change their dividend policies to reflect changes in tax 
preferences among their major shareholders. Similarly, Barclay, et al. (2008) find that 
when a block trade is made from individual taxed investors to corporate investors with a 
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reduced tax burden on dividend income, the firms fail to take into account the change in 
the tax preferences of their owners. 
In Finland, taxation of dividends changed significantly in 2004 as a full imputation 
system was abolished, and a system of partial double taxation of corporate income was 
introduced. The magnitude of the change for individual investors was similar to that 
studied in Bell and Jenkinson (2002) in the U.K., as the tax burden on dividend income at 
the personal level in Finland went from zero to 19.6%. In this paper, we study 
simultaneous reactions to the change in taxation by both firms and investors. By looking 
at changes in both payout policy when controlling for ownership, and ownership when 
controlling for payout policy and its tax treatment, we shed light on the interactions 
between these two factors around a major tax reform. The firms’ reaction is measured by 
observing their dividend and share repurchase policies before and after a tax reform. We 
include measures of ownership structure to consider whether adjustments to the reform 
were affected by tax-effects of the firms’ main ownership groups. The ownership data is 
further observed throughout the reform to estimate whether the tax change also resulted 
in changes in ownership patterns.  
One can argue that presence of a large block owner makes firms more likely to adjust 
their dividend policies to reflect the preferences of such investors. Finnish ownership 
structures are typically much more concentrated than those in the U.S. and the U.K.  
Compared to evidence on ownership patterns in European countries by Barca and Becht 
(2001), the Finnish block ownership seems to fall somewhere between the Central 
European countries and the U.K. Less than 20% of the firms have a block holder owning 
more than 50% of the shares.
1
 Importantly, ownership concentration varies substantially 
in the cross section of Finnish firms. In the sample used in this study, the ownership share 
of the top five shareholders varies from 1.5% to 99.9%, with the average fluctuating from 
year to year around 50%. Combined, the facts that Finnish ownership concentration is 
between the Central European countries and the Anglo-Saxon countries, and that 
substantial variation in ownership concentration exists within the Finnish sample, make 
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 Evidence in Barca and Becht (2001) indicates that in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Italy, a single block 
holder owns more than 50% of shares in more than half of the listed firms. 
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Finland an interesting case to study whether firms’ ownership patterns affect the 
likelihood for them to adjust their payout policies.  
Our empirical results contrast results by Brav et al (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2004), 
Denis and Osobov (2008), Brown, et al. (2007), and Barclay, et al. (2008), who all 
provide evidence suggesting that individual ownership does not affect dividend policies. 
In reaction to the tax reform, Finnish firms adjusted their payout levels for both dividends 
and share repurchases based on their ownership structures. Especially in dividend payout 
decisions, firms take into account the tax effects of their shareholders. In the year prior to 
the tax reform, we find that ahead of the upcoming dividend taxation at the personal 
level, firms whose shareholders were more affected by the reform paid out substantially 
larger amounts to their shareholders. We further find that payout variables are significant 
determinants of ownership structures.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss related literature. In 
section 3, we present the main features of the 2004 tax reform in Finland. In section 4, the 
data is presented. Empirical results are reported in section 5, and summary and 
conclusions follow in section 6. 
2. Taxes and Dividend Policy 
Tax effects of dividends can be traded away if taxed investors sell their high yield stocks 
to non-taxed investors who capture the dividend and subsequently sell the stocks back to 
taxed investors. The connection between firms’ dividend policies and taxation of their 
owners becomes irrelevant if owners with varying tax burdens engage in such tax-
induced trading around the ex-dividend day. Several authors offer support for dynamic 
tax-induced trading by reporting abnormal trading volumes around the ex-dividend day.
2
 
However, the U.S. evidence on dividend taxation as the driving force on trading around 
the ex-dividend day is mixed. The results by Koski and Scruggs (1998) suggest that 
traders engage in dividend-capturing trading around the ex-dividend day, but that tax 
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clienteles fail to explain the trading behavior. More recently, Graham and Kumar (2006) 
study trading behavior of a large sample of U.S. retail investors, and find that their 
income (and thus their marginal tax rate) significantly affects their trading around the ex-
dividend day. The price drop on the ex-dividend day tends to be smaller than the size of 
the dividend,
3
 which suggests that the value of dividends is not fully traded away in 
dividend-capturing trade. In Finland, Rantapuska (2008), and Felixson and Liljeblom 
(2008) both report evidence consistent with tax-induced trading around the ex-dividend 
day. Dividends in Finland are normally paid annually, rather than quarterly, which may 
increase incentives for tax-induced trading around the ex-dividend day, as the amount of 
dividend relative to transaction costs should increase attractiveness of the activity.  
The question of whether investors adjust to firms’ dividend policies is considered in 
several studies of investors’ trading behavior around changes in dividend policy, such as 
dividend changes, initiations or omissions. Mixed evidence on investor adjustment 
around dividend-altering events is provided by Richardson et al (1986), Michaely et al 
(1995) and Seida (2001), as well as by Graham and Kumar (2006). Binay (2001) finds 
significant changes in institutional ownership after dividend omissions and initiations. 
Grinstein and Michaely (2005) study the interactions between investor adjustments and 
firm payout policy changes by considering both institutional ownership and payout policy 
adjustments in the U.S. between 1980 and 1996. They find that despite institutional 
owners in the U.S. seem to prefer dividend-paying firms over non-dividend-paying firms, 
the level of dividends does not matter, as increases in dividends fail to attract increased 
institutional holdings. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) further fail to find evidence of an 
increase in institutional ownership or ownership concentration leading to changes in 
firms’ payout policy. Holmen, et al. (2008) study the tax records of corporate insiders in 
Sweden to establish their marginal tax rates, which allows them to explore the connection 
between marginal tax rates of insiders and dividend policy. They find that firms with 
insiders who have low tax rates pay higher dividends, and also that when insiders with 
zero tax rates sell blocks, firms tend to adjust by lowering their dividends.  In a recent 
                                                 
3
 See e.g. Elton and Gruber (1970), Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984), Green and Rydqvist (1999), and Graham, 
Michaely and Roberts (2003). 
 
5 
study, Desai and Jin (2008) explore the connection between the presence of dividend-
averse institutional investors and firms’ payout ratios, and find evidence of both investors 
adjusting to exogenous changes in the payout policy, and payout policies adjusting to 
changes in investor composition.  
Two recent studies search for evidence of firms catering to dividend clienteles on a 
country-by-country aggregate level. Denis and Osobov (2008) and von Eije and 
Megginson (2008) study the connection between the valuation premium of dividend-
paying firms and firms’ payout behavior. Both studies fail to find evidence of firms 
adjusting their dividends to the demands of the market. 
Annual dividend changes may be too small to induce investors to adjust their holdings in 
a measurable way. Studying the interactions between firms’ payout policies and changes 
in investor holdings over a long period of time is also technically challenging, as both 
variables typically contain a time trend. Tax regime changes cause more substantial one-
time effects on investors’ preferences on dividends versus capital gains. Tax regime 
changes are also external to the firm, which allows studying of subsequent reactions by 
both firms and investors.  
For the U.S., Perez-Gonzales (2003) studies changes in firms’ dividend policies around 
the tax reforms from 1981 to 1999. He finds some support for firms adjusting their 
policies in line with investor preferences, as payout levels are negatively related to the tax 
disadvantage of dividends relative to capital gains according to his results. He further 
finds that the effect is limited to firms where large shareholders are affected by the tax 
reforms. Poterba (2004) finds a significant relationship between dividend payouts and 
average marginal tax rates during 1935 to 2002. Chetty and Saez (2005) document a 20% 
increase in dividend payments in the U.S. after the dividend tax cut in 2003.  The 
response to the tax cut was the strongest among firms with strong principals whose tax 
incentives changed. Brown, et al. (2007) find that managerial holdings explain cross-
sectional differences in how the firms in the U.S. reacted in 2003. While high individual 
ownership in their sample fails to boost dividends, high executive ownership does 
increase dividend payouts. Finally, Graham and Kumar (2006) study retail investors’ 
portfolio dividend yields around the tax reform of 1993. Although portfolio holdings 
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offer only an indirect way to test whether the firm or the investor reacts to a regulatory 
change, their robustness checks that consider additions to portfolios support their main 
finding that investors rather than firms adjust.  
Tax regime changes typically affect investor preferences between dividends and share 
repurchases. Brown, et al. (2007) and Blouin, et al. (2007) find support for a substitution 
of dividends for share repurchases after the 2003 tax change. Blouin, et al. (2007) further 
report that the substitution is concentrated in firms with high individual ownership, 
suggesting that firms adjust their payout channels depending on their ownership structure. 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) also find support for substitution in the U.S. cross section 
over a longer time horizon. While personal taxes are the most obvious factor affecting the 
choice between dividends and repurchases, other potential factors also exist. Renneboog 
and Trojanowski (2005) report that dividends tend to be preferred over share repurchases 
in the U.K. for firms that have block holders, regardless of those block holders’ tax 
status. They propose strict insider trading rules as a possible explanation, as those rules 
make share repurchases less appealing for the shareholders with an insider status. 
In summary, while existence of dividend clienteles is supported by numerous studies, the 
evidence on firm’s adjusting their payout levels is only emerging, especially outside the 
U.S. Few studies consider the simultaneous reactions of the firms, and the investors’. 
Understanding the interactions is important for firms and investors alike. 
3. The Tax Reform and ownership patterns 
Prior to the 2004 tax reform, dividend income taxation in Finland was based on the 1993 
legislation, which placed all capital income and corporate profits under a single flat tax 
rate. Originally, the rate was 25% (in 1993), but it was successively raised to 28% (in 
1996), and finally to 29% (in 2000). Furthermore, a full imputation (avoir fiscal) system 
applied to dividend distributions, which effectively made dividends tax-free for domestic 
investors at the personal level. The 2004 reform altered the tax rates both at corporate and 
personal income level, and more importantly replaced the full imputation system by 
introducing partial double taxation of corporate profits.  
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The reform lowered the corporate profits tax rate from 29% to 26% and the flat personal 
capital income tax-rate from 29% to 28%. The abandonment of the full imputation 
system made 70% of dividends received taxable income (this rate was 57%, for dividends 
paid during the adjustment year of 2005). Therefore, the effective post-reform tax-rate on 
dividend income for individual investors is 19.6% (0.7 times 0.28), whereas prior to the 
reform, the dividend income tax-rate for individual domestic investors was zero, due to 
the full imputation system.  
While the 2004 tax reform increased taxation of dividend income substantially, several 
exceptions exist. These exceptions are interesting, as they cause different investor groups 
to view the reform differently. First, several institutions are exempt from dividend taxes, 
including mutual funds, mutual banking firms, and several governmental institutions, 
such as the Bank of Finland. Second, dividends received by a corporation from another 
corporation are tax-free. However, for dividends received from a publicly-listed firm, this 
rule applies only when the recipient is another listed non-financial firm, or when the 
equity stake held by the receiving corporation is more than 10% of the shares 
outstanding. Finally, tax treatment of dividends paid to foreign investors was not 
amended in the reform. Foreign investors are subject to a withholding tax that depends on 
bilateral agreements between countries. For most foreign owners, a tax of 15% is 
withheld from dividends received from a Finnish firm. 
The tax reform did not come as a surprise either to the Finnish firms or to the financial 
markets. A legal challenge against the differential treatment of foreign investors in the 
old tax system is seen as one of the origins of the 2004 tax reform. The challenge was 
made in the summer of 2002, and as it was clear that the Finnish dividend taxation was at 
odds with the EU standards, a change to the system was imminent. Later in 2002, a tax 
reform panel appointed by the Ministry of Finance published a report that proposed 
changes to the then-current dividend taxation system. The report suggested sweeping 
changes, including full double-taxation of dividends, but it was met with resistance 
within the government. In November of 2003, the government produced a draft of its own 
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Table 1 provides information on dividend taxation in Finland after the 2004 tax reform, 
by investor category. As mentioned above, taxation of dividends increased in general, 
with exceptions of groups such as mutual funds and governmental institutions. The 
reform also left the tax preference of foreign investors intact, as they continued to face 
the withholding tax (typically 15%) that was levied on them prior to the reform as well. 
Table 1 also indicates the tax preference ratio of each investor group. The ratio is 
calculated following Poterba (2004). As the tax preference ratios reveal, the 2004 reform 
reduced the preference for dividends for most investor groups, while for some groups, the 
preference ratio was unaffected by the reform. 
Furthermore, Table 1 shows the percentage of total ownership by different investor 
categories. The statistics are based on the top five shareholders for each firm. The bottom 
panel of the table accumulates data combined for all investor categories. The top five 
owners own a significant portion of the aggregate market. As a consequence, our 
ownership data covers approximately half of the total ownership of Finnish publicly-
listed firms. Interestingly, ownership by private persons drops significantly from 2004 to 
2005, and mutual funds are increasing their share of ownership. The relative tax-
efficiency of mutual fund holdings, compared to direct holdings, improved in the reform, 
so the shift in ownership pattern is consistent with a suggestion that ownership patterns 
are affected by the reform. 
As mentioned above, block ownership in Finland is between that of the Continental 
Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries. Figure 1 indicates prevalence of block ownership 
in the Finnish cross section. The figure is comparable to the country-by-country graphs in 
Barca and Becht (2001). Out of the eight European countries that they study, Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Spain and the Netherlands exhibit clearly more block 
ownership than what our sample indicates for Finland. In the U.K., on the other hand, 
only the top decile contains firms with 30% block owners. It is interesting to note that 
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according to Figure 1, block ownership experienced a shift downwards between 2002 and 
2005.    
4. Data 
We use dividend data from the Helsinki Stock Exchange. The data cover all dividends 
paid during the years 2003 to 2006 for all companies listed on the exchange, 
corresponding to corporate profits for years 2002 to 2005. In Finland, companies are 
required to report on completed share repurchases. Our data on share repurchases is 
gathered from press releases that firms submitted in order to fulfil their reporting 
requirement. Ownership data come from Pörssitieto manuals, which report holdings and 
investor types for top five shareholders of each publicly-listed company in Finland. We 
also use the Finnish Central Securities Depository to obtain the level of foreign 
ownership. For financial statement data and stock return and price data, we rely on 
Datastream. The variables used in our analysis are defined in Table 2. 
The number of firms listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange during our sample years is 
144 (2003), 136 (2004), 137 (2005) and 131 (2006), which sums up to 548 potential data 
points. A small number of missing data points and delistings in the middle of the year 
cause minor deterioration in our sample so that the final full sample consists of 524 firm-
year observations for 148 different firms. To avoid further deterioration, we use a 
substitution method to replace missing data points for firm characteristics that we use as 
control variables. In the substitution method a missing data point is replaced by the cross 
sectional average for the data item in that year.
5
  
Descriptive statistics for various measures of dividend payout and profitability, along 
with other firm characteristics, are reported in Table 3. The table provides information 
regarding both the full sample and two subsamples that are based on the extent to which 
the firm’s top five owners were affected by the tax change. The table indicates very high 
dividend payouts during the period, as the mean payout ratio is over 140% and the mean 
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variables are dropped from the regressions. 
 
10 
dividend yield is 4.54%. Out of all holdings by top five owners, the proportion held by 
investors who were affected by the tax change is approximately 55%, but that percentage 
varies substantially across firms (averages are 21% and 88% in the two subgroups, 
respectively). As Table 3 indicates, the two subgroups deviate significantly in size, 
market-to-book ratio, leverage, and foreign ownership. We control for all these factors in 
our regression models. 
5. Empirical analysis 
We report the evolution of dividend payouts, dividend yields, and share repurchases 
during our sample years in Table 4. The table segregates the sample into two groups of 
firms, based on whether the total equity ownership of those among the top 5 shareholders 
who were affected by the tax reform is higher or lower than 30%. The 30% cut-off point 
is arbitrarily drawn in an attempt to identify a level of reasonably large corporate 
influence by the tax-affected owners. Since the dividend payout variable exhibits extreme 
positive skewness due to some firms paying high dividends despite low earnings, we 
have truncated our payout ratio variable at the level of 10. In Table 4, Panel A, we report 
statistics on the dividend payout ratio for the full (truncated) sample, as well as for a 
restricted sample, where payouts higher than 800% have been excluded.
6
 The asterisks in 
the table indicate statistical significance in the difference between the two groups at the 
10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Due to the relatively small sample sizes in the 
sub-groups, we use the bootstrapped t-test for means, and the non-parametric median test 
for medians. The key statistics are also illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Table 1. Ownership and taxation by investor category
Dividend Taxation
after 2004 Before After 2002 2003 2004 2005 All Years
Banks and Insurance companies Taxed 1.4085 1.1167 Mean 0.0514 0.0401 0.0388 0.0306 0.0407
(excluding mutual banks) Stdev 0.1004 0.0902 0.1041 0.0622 0.0915
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 0.6420 0.6530 0.8337 0.4370 0.8337
Limited Partnership Taxed 1.4085 1.1167 Mean 0.0055 0.0040 0.0038 0.0008 0.0036
Stdev 0.0462 0.0303 0.0280 0.0071 0.0318
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 0.5190 0.3310 0.3010 0.0760 0.5190
Private persons Taxed 1.4085 1.1167 Mean 0.1555 0.1596 0.1566 0.1242 0.1497
Stdev 0.2203 0.2226 0.2193 0.1930 0.2146
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 0.9450 0.9050 0.9400 0.7780 0.9450
Pension institutions Taxed 1.4085 1.1167 Mean 0.0258 0.0258 0.0243 0.0305 0.0265
Stdev 0.0420 0.0427 0.0362 0.0421 0.0408
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 0.2585 0.2585 0.1531 0.2324 0.2585
Towns and municipalities Taxed if ownership 1.4085 1.1167 Mean 0.0038 0.0042 0.0034 0.0008 0.0031
below 10% Stdev 0.0326 0.0334 0.0306 0.0062 0.0284
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 0.3420 0.3420 0.3420 0.0640 0.3420
Non listed companies Taxed if ownership 1.4085 1.1167 Mean 0.1215 0.1150 0.1094 0.1089 0.1140
below 10% Stdev 0.1951 0.1842 0.1753 0.1579 0.1790
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 0.8364 0.7859 0.7650 0.6620 0.8364
Associations Taxed if ownership 1.4085 1.1167 Mean 0.0157 0.0164 0.0157 0.0120 0.0150
below 10% Stdev 0.0711 0.0721 0.0713 0.0602 0.0689
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 0.4860 0.4860 0.4890 0.3981 0.4890
Foreign owners Withholding tax 0.8500 0.8500 Mean 0.0379 0.0468 0.0471 0.0395 0.0428
Stdev 0.1148 0.1340 0.1311 0.0987 0.1206
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 0.6929 0.6929 0.6929 0.4065 0.6929
Listed companies No tax 1.4085 1.3889 Mean 0.0309 0.0272 0.0185 0.0135 0.0229
Stdev 0.1015 0.1006 0.0789 0.0562 0.0873
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 0.6005 0.6005 0.5984 0.4300 0.6005
Mutual Funds No tax 1.0000 1.0000 Mean 0.0117 0.0137 0.0194 0.0233 0.0168
Stdev 0.0266 0.0276 0.0333 0.0377 0.0316
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 0.1778 0.1371 0.1760 0.1790 0.1790
Tax exempt (gov't organisations) No tax 1.0000 1.0000 Mean 0.0375 0.0330 0.0332 0.0382 0.0354
Stdev 0.1388 0.1211 0.1175 0.1239 0.1256
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 0.9530 0.6189 0.6168 0.5630 0.9530
Mutual Banks No tax 1.4085 1.3889 Mean 0.0033 0.0034 0.0035 0.0000 0.0026
Stdev 0.0397 0.0397 0.0393 0.0000 0.0347
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 0.4711 0.4595 0.4486 0.0000 0.4711
Trusts No tax 1.0000 1.0000 Mean 0.0076 0.0083 0.0090 0.0093 0.0085
Stdev 0.0354 0.0364 0.0362 0.0354 0.0358
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 0.2478 0.2534 0.2513 0.2492 0.2534
Total ownership by five 1.3073 1.0927 Mean 0.5082 0.4975 0.4827 0.4316 0.4817
largest shareholders Stdev 0.2145 0.2058 0.2105 0.1787 0.2051
Min 0.0154 0.0227 0.0146 0.0447 0.0146
Max 0.9983 0.9985 0.9985 0.9390 0.9985
Tax preference ratio % of Shares Held by Ownership category
Table indicates proportions of ownership by different investor categories and by sample years. Ownership by owners among the top 5 shareholders of each firm 
is included. For each investor group, information on the tax status after the 2004 tax reform is also included. The tax preference ratio before and after the reform 




Figure 1 displays the prevalence of block ownership among Finnish firms. The graph is modeled after similar graphs 
for various European countries in Barca and Becht (2001). 
 
Table 4 and Figure 2 together reveal several interesting features. First, dividends are 
higher initially (in 2002) in the group with more tax-affected owners: a higher median 
payout for the full sample, higher mean and median payouts in the restricted sample, and 
a substantially higher dividend yield. A lower mean paired with a higher median for 
payout in the full sample for 2002 highlights the skewness issue discussed above. 
According to Panel B of Table 4, the difference in dividend yield for 2002 (5.57% versus 
3.7%) is significant at the 10% level. Tax-affected owners are largely private owners. As 
they faced a zero tax on dividends prior to the reform, the finding that their ownership 
among top five shareholders is connected to higher dividend yields before the reform is 
consistent with taxation of dividends affecting either investors’ portfolio choices or 
firm’s payout policies.     
In 2003, dividends increase in both groups in anticipation of the reform of 2004, but the 
increase is more profound for firms with more tax affected owners. The mean (together 
with median) payout ratio is significantly higher for the tax-affected group in 2003, when 
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dividend yields for the two groups differ greatly (Table 4, Panel B, left-hand-side 
columns). Both differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Consistent with increased taxation of dividends, dividends decrease after the reform in 
both groups. The ultimate payouts and dividend yield levels in 2005 are indifferent 
between the two groups (payouts of 0.66 and 0.59 in the restricted group, dividend yields 
of 3.54% versus 3.97%).  
Prior to the reform, share repurchases are more common in firms dominated by owners 
who are not affected by the reform. That group includes foreign owners, who, as 
mentioned above, were in a tax-disadvantage regarding dividend income prior to the 
taxation change. After the reform, share repurchases increase in both groups, and the 
mean levels of share repurchases become more closely aligned between the two groups.  
 
Table 2. Definition of variables
Variable Description
PAY-OUT Total dividend per share/Earnings per share.
REPURCHASES Share repurchases/Total equity available for distribution.
TAXED OWNERS % of shares held by five largest shareholders whose dividend income 
became taxable as a result of the tax reform, divided by total % of 
shares held by five largest shareholders.
PAST RETURN Change in the market value of the company during the last 6 months of 
the year.
SIZE Ln(sales)
MKT-TO-BOOK Market value of equity/book value of equity.
FCF (EBIT + depreciation & amortization)/Sales.
ROA Net profit/total assets.
LEVERAGE Long-term debt/total assets.
FOREIGN OWN % of shares held by non-domestic shareholders.
Y2003 - Y2005 Indicator variables taking the value of one for years 2003, 2004, and 
2005, respectively, and zero otherwise.
Description of varibles used in the analyses. The dividend data is obtained from the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange. The dividends paid during 2003-2006 are based on corporate profits for years 2002-2005. Data 
on share repurchases is gathered from press releases submitted through the exchange. Ownership data 
regarding holdings and investor type of top five shareholders come from Pörssitieto manuals. Levels of 
foreign ownership are obtained from the Finnish Central Securities Depository. Financial statement data 





5.1. Determinants of dividend payout 
Next, we move to more rigorous analysis of the determinants of dividends, share 
repurchases and tax clientele ownership structure around the tax reform of 2004 with 
multiple regression models. We use the dividend Pay-Out Ratio (PAY-OUT), the Share 
Repurchases to Total Payable (REPURCHASES) and the proportion of tax-sensitive 
owners among the top 5 shareholders (TAXED OWNERS), as dependent variables in 
these models.  
Studies of dividend payouts and cash distributions are often are based on Lintner’s (1956) 
early work. Lintner’s partial adjustment model builds on the assumptions that dividends 
convey signals about the firm’s earnings, and that dividend pay-out ratios are sticky, with 
firms being reluctant to lower them. Consequently, managers consider future 
sustainability of the firm’s earnings before altering the dividend policy. In the partial 
adjustment model, the change in dividend is explained by prior dividend payout and prior 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Dividend Yield 0.045 0.047 0.042 0.040 0.049 0.053
PAY-OUT 1.417 2.526 1.507 2.745 1.327 2.289
Share Repurchases to Total Payable 0.008 0.047 0.012 0.063 0.004 0.023
Dividends to Total Payable 0.175 0.376 0.167 0.441 0.184 0.299
Dividend Yield (ordinary dividend) 0.040 0.036 0.039 0.034 0.041 0.039
Dividends to Total Payable (ordinary dividend) 0.158 0.355 0.156 0.431 0.159 0.258
PAY-OUT (ordinary dividend) 1.329 2.462 1.431 2.665 1.226 2.242
Lagged PAY-OUT 1.294 2.320 1.365 2.531 1.225 2.096
TAXED OWNERS 0.546 0.367 0.213 0.156 0.880 0.152
PAST RETURN 0.107 0.349 0.102 0.297 0.113 0.395
SIZE 3.882 2.065 4.200 2.174 3.564 1.901
MKT-TO-BOOK 2.089 4.243 1.643 2.671 2.536 5.342
EBIT to Sales 0.062 0.551 0.042 0.590 0.081 0.510
ROA 0.040 0.181 0.044 0.168 0.036 0.194
ROE 0.140 2.108 0.263 2.908 0.016 0.646
FCF 0.173 0.495 0.182 0.532 0.164 0.456
LEVERAGE 0.169 0.197 0.187 0.234 0.151 0.150
FOREIGN OWN 0.177 0.213 0.237 0.238 0.118 0.165




TAXED OWNERS > 
median
The sample consists of firms traded on the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX) during the time period from 2003 to 2006. The 
full sample includes 524 firm-year observations. Bold numbers indicate a mean that is higher than that for the comparison 
group at the 90% confidence level or higher. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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and current profitability. Both profitability and prior payout are expected to have a 
positive impact on the current payout. The constant term is also expected to have a 
positive sign, to reflect firms’ reluctance to reduce dividends. 
In our simplest regression specification in Column (1) of Table 5, the lagged payout ratio 
and current and lagged ROA are the only variables explaining the current payout ratio. In 
line with predictions of Lintner (1956), the dividend payout ratios are positively related to 
prior payout ratios and prior and current profitability.  
Firms’ dividend payment behaviour in different countries may vary depending on factors 
such as accounting standards and practices, and also the structure of the local financial 
markets. For example, Goergen, et al. (2005) note that German conservative accounting 
practice may make cash flows a more meaningful determinant of dividend payouts than 
published earnings. Indeed, Andres, et al. (2009) report findings from Germany that are 
consistent with that notion. Von Eije and Megginson (2008) also note that earnings have 
a poor explanatory power on payouts in Europe. When we replace the ROA measures in 
Column (1) of Table 5 with a measure of free cash flow, we obtain virtually identical 
results to those reported in the table (results not reported). In later columns of Table 5, 
we, nevertheless, use free cash flow as an additional control variable. 
In order to analyze the effects of the Finnish tax law change, we next include dummies 
for dividends paid out of profits for accounting years of 2003 to 2005
7
, the variable 
capturing the effect of the law change on the main owners (TAXED OWNERS), as well 
as interaction variables for the pre-reform time period (TAXED OWNERS x Y2002 and 
TAXED OWNERS x Y2003). Our expectation is that firms pay higher dividends prior to 
the reform, and that the behaviour is stronger for firms whose shareholders are more 
affected by the law change (recall that the reform made no investor group better off, but 
some investor groups worse off). In particular, the interaction variable for year 2003 is  
                                                 
7
 The payment occurs in the subsequent year, so that for example Y2003 captures dividends paid in 2004. 
Accounting year 2002 is the omitted year, serving as the base case. 
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interesting, as it captures the effect of ownership structure on “last minute” distributions 
prior to the new tax regulations coming into effect.
8
 The results are reported in Column 
(2) of Table 5. The earnings measures and the lagged payout measure continue to exhibit 
positive and significant signs. The column also indicates a reduction in dividend payouts 
in the time period after the regulatory change, with the dummy for 2004 entering with a 
negative and significant sign. Firms with tax-sensitive owners pay higher dividends prior 
to the reform, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient for the interaction 
variable capturing payout behaviour for firms with more tax-sensitive owners in 2003. 
Table 4. Payouts in two ownership categories    
Panel 
A. 
 Dividend Pay-Out, Full Sample Dividend Pay-Out, Pay-Out < 8 
        









OWNERS > 30% 
2002 Mean 1.5175  1.3988 0.6475  0.9364 
 Median 0.5000  0.7500*** 0.4531  0.7333*** 
 St.dev. 2.8766  2.2764 0.8915  1.1076 
 N 43  98 39  93 
2003 Mean 2.0897  2.2921 0.6326  1.2167*** 
 Median 0.5128  1.2903*** 0.4967  1.0722*** 
 St.dev. 3.4929  3.112 0.6996  1.2571 
 N 45  89 38  78 
2004 Mean 0.6817  0.8518 0.4699  0.6314 
 Median 0.4112  0.4962 0.4070  0.4848 
 St.dev. 1.5466  1.5617 0.6184  0.6387 
 N 45  85 44  83 
2005 Mean 1.2651  1.1052 0.6557  0.5896 
 Median 0.458  0.5128 0.4514  0.4898 
 St.dev. 2.5033  2.2279 0.9402  0.576 
 N 46  73 43  69 
 
 
                                                 
8





 Dividend Yield  Share Repurchases to Total 
Payable 









OWNERS > 30% 
2002 Mean 0.037  0.0557** 0.0084*  0.0015* 
 Median 0.0398  0.0463 0.0000  0.0000 
 St.dev. 0.0365  0.0596 0.0308  0.013 
 N 43  98 43  98 
2003 Mean 0.0403  0.0637** 0.0101*  0.0021* 
 Median 0.0342  0.0548*** 0.0000  0.0000 
 St.dev. 0.0409  0.0589 0.0418  0.0096 
 N 45  89 45  89 
2004 Mean 0.0279  0.0410** 0.0206  0.0112 
 Median 0.0300  0.0380** 0.0000  0.0000 
 St.dev. 0.0235  0.0357 0.1166  0.0509 
 N 45  85 45  85 
2005 Mean 0.0354  0.0397 0.0120  0.0081 
 Median 0.0332  0.0336 0.0000  0.0000 
 St.dev. 0.0322  0.0408 0.0466  0.0381 
 N 46  73 46  73 
Table displays annual descriptive statistics for dividend payouts both with and without extreme 
observations (payout > 8). Each measure is reported for two types of firms: companies where the 
owners affected by the tax reform own less than 30% of the total amount of shares owned by the 5 
largest shareholders, and firms where that ownership category owns more than 30%. The sample 
focuses on firm payouts referring to accounting years of 2002 to 2005, and consists of firms traded on 
the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX). The difference between the two ownership groups is tested using 
a bootstrapped t-test for means and a medians test for medians, with ***, **, * indicating statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
In Column (3) of Table 5, we further include a number of firm-specific control variables. 
A motive for a firm to signal with dividends is expected to be stronger if the firm is 
perceived by insiders to be undervalued. We include the stock return for the past six 
months (PAST RETURN), and the market to book ratio (MKT-TO-BOOK) to control for 
this potential effect on payouts. Firms with high free cash flow may have an incentive to 
offer higher dividend payouts to reduce their agency problems (Jensen, 1986), which is 
why we include free cash flow (FCF) as a control variable
9
. The foreign ownership 
                                                 
9
 Our FCF measure is calculated as (EBIT + depreciation&amortization)/Sales. Use of an alternative 
measure that also captures changes in working capital and investments deteriorates the sample size severely 
(from 464 to 231) due to data limitations. However, the results within that limited sample are similar to 
those reported in Table 4.  
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variable (FOREIGN OWN) is set to capture effects of a differential treatment of foreign 
owners, reported by Liljeblom and Pasternack (2006). Foreign owners faced a 15% 
withholding tax on dividends during our sample period, which made them an investor 
category with a reduced preference for dividends prior to the reform. Larger, more 
mature firms may have more permanent payout policies, and also smaller growth 
opportunities, which motivate us to include the natural logarithm of sales (SIZE) as a 
control variable. Finally, high financial leverage may reduce dividends for firms that are 
financially constrained, or alternatively indicate higher payouts for firms with low cash 
flow volatility, as they may be able to both carry a heavier debt load and sustain higher 
dividend payouts. To control for both of these effects, we include leverage (LEVERAGE) 
in our regression models. 
 
Figure 2. . 
Figure 2 displays median Pay-Out Ratios  (in Panel A), measured as total dividend per share over earnings per share, 
average Dividend Yields (in Panel B), measured as total dividend per share over the stock price at the year-end, and 
average Share Repurchases to Total Payout (in Panel C), measured as the share repurchases in euro over free equity, for 
firms with taxationally affected owners owning either less than 30%, or over 30%, of the shares held by the five largest 
shareholders at the year-end. The sample focuses on firm payouts during the time period from 2003 to 2006 (the 
accounting years of 2002 to 2005, as used in the figures), and consists of firms traded on the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
(HEX). The figures are based on data for the full sample of 524 firm-years. 
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The results of our full model in Column (3) of Table 5 indicate that the added control 
variables do not affect our earlier findings. In this specification, the ownership variables 
gain some strength. The interaction variable for tax-affected owners in 2003 is now 
significant at the 5% level. None of the control variables are statistically significant, and 
interestingly, even as a group, they fail to increase the explanatory power of the model 
from that in the second column. 
Payout preferences of different shareholder types may vary for reasons other than 
taxation. For example, superior ability to monitor management may lower dividend 
preferences. To ensure that such effects do not drive our results, we include dummies for 
twelve different ownership types indicated in Table 1, with Private Persons serving as the 
omitted group. Each dummy takes the value of one for each firm-year observation where 
the ownership type is present among the top five shareholders. The results are reported in 
Column (4) of Table 5, and they are very similar to those reported in Column (3). 
Interestingly, none of the ownership type dummies exhibits a significant sign. We can 
therefore conclude that tax-effects dominate any other ownership type specific effects on 
payout policy.  
Our sample includes financial firms, which are commonly left out of corporate finance 
studies due to differences in accounting practices between financial and industrial firms. 
We do the same in Column (5) of Table 5, mostly to ensure that our results are not driven 
by the financial firms in the sample. The results in Column (5) are consistent with those 
obtained with the full sample. The interaction variable of TAXED OWNERS x 2003 








2002 2003 2004 2005
Taxed of 5 Largest < 30% Taxed of 5 Largest > 30%
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gains further strength. Also, free cash flow (FCF) enters now with a positive and 
significant sign, in support of an agency cost motivation for higher dividend payouts. It is 
also interesting to note that the vast shift in dividend payouts that occurred around the tax 
reform is explained by our independent variables to the extent that none of the year 
dummies is significant in either column (4) or (5) of Table 5. 
 
Table displays OLS results where the dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio.The sample includes 
cash distributions referring to accounting years from 2002 to 2005 by all firms listed on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange (HEX). Column (1) shows estimation results from a basic Lintner dividend payout model, 
Column (2) also includes dummy variables for years 2003-2005 and variables measuring the fraction of 
shareholders affected by the 2004 tax reform, and finally Column (3) includes control variables. In order to 
exclude extreme outliers in the dependent variable, the sample is restricted to include firm-years where the 
dividend payout ratio is less than 8.Robust t-values are reported in parentheses, and ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
Table 5. Dividend payout 
regressions 
     
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











































Y2003  -0.0152 0.0241 0.035 -0.0245 -0.0841 
  (-0.072) (0.114) (0.162) (-0.108) (-0.441) 
Y2004  -0.3342 -0.3197 -0.2742 -0.3331 -0.3120 
  (-1.796)* (-1.749)* (-1.442) (-1.634) (-1.789)* 
Y2005  -0.1196 -0.0768 -0.0237 -0.0880 -0.1087 
  (-0.611) (-0.396) (-0.115) (-0.405) (-0.581) 
TAXED OWNERS  0.0826 0.1203 0.1076 0.0985 0.1061 
  (0.691) (0.966) (0.797) (0.710) (0.878) 
TAXED OWNERS  0.3407 0.3270 0.3693 0.3852 0.1163 
x2002  (1.115) (1.065) (1.141) (1.117) (0.460) 
TAXED OWNERS  0.5030 0.5465 0.6209 0.6353 0.4389 
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PAST RETURN   -0.1413 -0.1707 -0.1471 -0.1461 
   (-1.252) (-1.484) (-1.222) (-1.455) 
SIZE   0.0319 0.036 0.0313 0.0316 
   (1.378) (1.484) (1.123) (1.579) 
MKT-TO-BOOK   -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0005 
   (-0.444) (-0.239) (-0.444) (-0.144) 
FCF   0.1132 0.1011 0.1710 0.1215 
   (1.399) (1.169) (1.872)* (1.661)* 
LEVERAGE   0.0545 0.017 0.1836 0.1022 
   (0.287) (0.080) (0.875) (0.643) 
FOREIGN OWN   0.0492 0.0394 0.0225 0.0562 
   (0.210) (0.159) (0.080) (0.259) 







(1.058) (1.909)* (2.436)** 
Owner type 
dummies 
no no no yes no no 
N 464 464 464 464 410 464 
ADJ. R
2 
0.099 0.179 0.177 0.164 0.172 0.162 
 
Lintner (1956) type partial adjustment models are set to capture fractional changes in 
firms’ payout policies. However, our sample contains firms that initiated dividends 
during the sample period, and thus may not fit the Lintner (1956) model very well. While 
Denis and Osobov (2008) report that in their international sample, determinants 
explaining payouts for dividend initiators do not differ from those for firms with 
continuing dividend payment policies, the reform that we study may have urged an 
unexpected set of firms to initiate their dividend payments, especially in the year prior to 
the new law taking effect. To ensure that such firms are not driving our results, we run 
our main model only with firms that paid dividends in 2002. Compared to columns (3), 
(4), and (5), the results regarding the effect of taxation of main owners become slightly 
stronger in that sample (results not reported).  
As noted above, many firms paid extraordinary dividends during the run-up to the new 
dividend tax regulation. In the final column of Table 5, we include only ordinary 
dividends in the PAY-OUT measure. The results are similar to those reported earlier. The 
coefficient for the interaction variable (TAXED OWNERS x 2003) is lower and slightly 
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less significant, indicating that extraordinary dividends paid during our sample period 
strengthened our earlier findings, but were not driving the results. 
In summary, the results in Table 5 indicate the reduction in dividends following the 2004 
reform. The payouts were significantly higher immediately prior to the reform among 
firms whose ownership were to face the most negative consequences of the tax reform. 
These findings are robust to controlling for various variables that have been found to 
affect dividend payouts in prior literature. The findings are also robust to various ways to 
consider firms’ payout behaviour.    
5.2. Results for share repurchases 
To further test the changes in cash distribution around the 2004 tax reform, we analyze 
share repurchases during our sample period. In the next set of regressions, we use a 
measure of share repurchases (REPURCHASES, defined as share repurchases divided by 
total equity capital available for distribution) as the dependent variable. The results of this 
analysis are reported in Table 6. 
In Column (1) of Table 6, we test for changes in repurchase activity during the sample 
years with year dummies for years 2003-2005. As before, year 2002 acts as a control 
group. Opposite to dividend payouts in Table 5, each year enters with a positive sign. The 
size of the coefficient grows much larger when moving from 2003 to 2004, suggesting 
that a shift from dividends to share repurchases occurred at that time (recall that a similar 
but opposite shift was reported in Table 5, regarding dividend payouts). However, none 
of the year dummies is statistically significant. We also include ownership variables of 
TAXED OWNERS, and an interaction variable showing the effect of TAXED OWNERS 
during the post-reform years of 2004 and 2005. Out of them, TAXED OWNERS enters 
with a negative and statistically significant coefficient, providing albeit weak evidence of 
tax-sensitive ownership reducing repurchase activity during the sample period. 
In Column (2) of Table 6, we include the firm control variables that we used in Table 5, 
except for FOREIGN OWN, which is added in Column (3). TAXED OWNERS loses its 
statistical significance in Column (2), and in Column (3), FOREIGN OWN seems to 
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absorb most of the effect of tax-sensitive ownership (the two variables have a correlation 
coefficient of -0.34). Among control variables, size appears to affect share repurchases 
positively, and firms with high foreign ownership are much more likely to repurchase 
their shares. The latter finding is in line with foreign owners being in a tax disadvantage 
regarding dividend distributions during the first part of the sample. 
In the final column of Table 6, we again include dummies for individual ownership types, 
with Private Persons as the omitted group. While the reported results are not markedly 
different between columns (3) and (4), two of the ownership types, namely Mutual Funds 
and Listed Companies, enter the regression with a negative and significant sign. Both 
ownership groups receive tax-free dividends both before and after the reform, reducing 
their incentive to demand share repurchases. Also, for listed companies, capital gains are 
taxable. Furthermore, during our sample period, some mutual funds have been able to 
report their performance relative to a price index that does not include dividends, giving 
those funds yet another reason to prefer dividends over share repurchases.  
 
Table displays OLS results where the dependent variable is Share Repurchases to Total Payable, measured as the 
share repurchases in euro divided by the total capital available for distribution (free equity). The sample includes cash 
distributions referring to accounting years from 2002 to 2005 by all firms listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
(HEX). Robust t-values are reported in parentheses, and ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
Table 6. Share repurchase 
regressions 
   









Y2003 0.001 0.007 0.0057 0.0055 
 (0.372) (1.552) (1.314) (1.211) 
Y2004 0.0158 0.0176 0.0156 0.0149 
 (1.163) (1.192) (1.044) (1.015) 
Y2005 0.01 0.0125 0.0099 0.0097 
 (1.122) (1.268) (0.995) (0.946) 
TAXED OWNERS -0.0092 -0.0069 -0.0017 -0.0007 
 (-1.902)* (-1.623) (-0.388) (-0.158) 
TAXED OWNERS -0.0096 -0.0105 -0.009 -0.0076 
x (Y2004 + Y2005) (-0.715) (-0.714) (-0.601) (-0.541) 
PAST RETURN  -0.0106 -0.0091 -0.009 
  (-1.573) (-1.375) (-1.372) 
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SIZE  0.0031 0.0016 0.0014 
  (1.961)* (1.461) (1.235) 
MKT-TO-BOOK  0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
  (1.037) (1.025) (0.823) 
FCF  0.002 0.0019 0.0027 
  (0.844) (0.796) (0.933) 
LEVERAGE  -0.0148 -0.0146 -0.0132 
  (-1.181) (-1.147) (-0.938) 
ROA  0.0029 0.0011 0.0035 





FOREIGN OWN   0.0382 0.0396 
   (2.478)** (2.681)*** 
CONSTANT 0.0089 -0.0044 -0.0071 -0.0093 
 (2.419)** (-0.558) (-0.832) (-1.024) 
Owner type dummies no no no yes 
N 524 524 524 524 
ADJ. R
2 
0.012 0.032 0.051 0.050 
 
5.3. Ownership and payouts 
Next, we explore potential endogeneity of tax-sensitive ownership, and its effect on 
firms’ cash distribution policy. In the regression models shown in Table 7, TAXED 
OWNERS is the dependent variable, and we include payout and share repurchase 
variables among the explanatory variables. Studies of cross-sectional ownership patterns, 
mainly ownership concentration, often follow Demsetz and Lehn (1985), who provide 
evidence of corporate ownership being endogeous. In their empirical model, they explain 
ownership concentration in the U.S. with size, control potential proxied by different risk 
measures, and dummies for regulatory issues in certain industries. Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001), further include leverage and firm performance among explanatory 
variables of ownership concentration. 
Our ownership models follow Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001), with the exception that we exclude firm specific risk from the models. The 
variable was not significant in Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). Furthermore, the Finnish 
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market includes a number of small (and family controlled) firms in high-risk industries, 
such as the IT-sector, which makes is less likely that high risk would be connected with 
low ownership concentration in the country. 
Larger firms are less likely to have a high concentration of tax-sensitive (mostly private) 
ownership. We control for that effect with our SIZE variable. Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) argue that higher leverage brings about increased monitoring, which in turn may 
discourage managerial entrenchment through high insider ownership. Accordingly, we 
also include LEVERAGE in our ownership specifications. While our dependent variable 
is not management ownership, substitution of private control by creditor control 
motivates an expected negative sign also in our case. Ownership variables tend to be 
related to profitability and firm valuation (see e.g. Maury 2006 for family firms in 
Europe), which is why we include ROA and MARKET-TO-BOOK among our control 
variables.  
Finally, we include an interaction variable PAY-OUT x (Y2004 + Y2005) to test for a 
differential effect on ownership structure based on payouts after the tax reform. A similar 
variable is also included for share repurchases. 
Column (1) of Table 7 indicates a negative and significant relation between share 
repurchases and tax-sensitive ownership. The payout ratio has an opposite effect on tax-
sensitive ownership, and becomes statistically significant in Column (2), where two 
insignificant variables are dropped. Among control variables, SIZE, MKT-TO-BOOK, 
and LEVERAGE significantly explain ownership by owners affected by the 2004 tax 
reform. The interaction terms are statistically insignificant, but the interaction dummy for 
PAY-OUT has the expected sign (we expect a lower interest in dividends after the tax 
reform). In Column (3) of Table 7, we only include firms where the top five shareholders 
combined own more than 30% of the shares. The results are very similar to those reported 
in Column (2). Finally, in Column (4), we leave out REPURCHASES, to only 
concentrate on the connection between payouts and ownership. Our findings regarding 
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payouts and their shift in the post-reform time period gain strength, with even the 
interaction variable being very close to statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Table 7. Ownership regressions    
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample full full block ownership full 








PAY-OUT 0.0857 0.0880 0.0826 0.0944 
 (1.535) (3.113)*** (2.597)*** (3.355)*** 
REPURCHASES -0.6476 -0.6486 -0.6379  
 (-3.621)*** (-3.653)*** (-3.937)***  
PAY-OUT -0.0415 -0.0449 -0.0340 -0.0500 
x (Y2004 + Y2005) (-0.696) (-1.466) (-0.978) (-1.633) 
REPURCHASES -0.003    
x (Y2004 + Y2005) (-0.045)    
SIZE -0.0303 -0.0308 -0.0429 -0.0335 
 (-3.528)*** (-3.755)*** (-4.549)*** (-4.092)*** 
MKT-TO-BOOK 0.0094 0.0095 0.0091 0.0094 
 (2.707)*** (2.752)*** (2.797)*** (2.805)** 
LEVERAGE -0.2361 -0.2269 -0.2424 -0.2179 
 (-3.179)*** (-3.366)*** (-3.470)*** (-3.266)*** 
ROA -0.0325    
 (-0.418)    
CONSTANT 0.6697 0.6686 0.6787 0.6714 
 (14.248)*** (15.347)*** (13.976)*** (15.346)*** 
N 487 487 397 487 
ADJ. R
2 
0.071 0.074 0.086 0.069 
Table displays OLS results where the dependent variable is the proportion of shares owned by the taxationally 
affected large owners in relationship to the shareholdings of all the 5 largest owners. The sample includes cash 
distributions referring to accounting years from 2002 to 2005 by all firms listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
(HEX). Observations where the payout ratio takes extreme values (> 800%) are excluded. The block ownership sample 
includes only firm years when the top five shareholders own more than 30% of the shares outstanding. Robust t-values 
are reported in parentheses, and ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
See Table 1 for variable defintions. 
 
5.4.Testing for interactions: results from 3SLS 
To further observe the extent to which not only firms but also owners adjusted to the 
2004 reform, we next employ simultaneous estimation (3SLS) to estimate a system of 
equations where the explanatory variables are: 1) the dividend Pay-Out Ratio (PAY-
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OUT), 2) Share Repurchases to Total Payable (REPURCHASES), and 3) the proportion 
of owners among the top 5 shareholders, affected by the reform (TAXED OWNERS). In 
the model specifications, we include the most important control variables from each 
previously reported regression model: PAST RETURN, SIZE, and FCF for dividends, 
SIZE, LEVERAGE, and FOREIGN OWN for share repurchases, and SIZE, MKT-TO-
BOOK, and LEVERAGE for Ownership. In the second specification on the right-hand 
column of Table 8, we have excluded SIZE from the payout stage in order to improve 
identification of the system.  
The results of the 3SLS estimation are consistent with the results reported above in 
Tables 5, 6 and 7. The results regarding the dividend Pay-Out Ratio are similar to those 
reported in Table 5 as the interaction variable between tax-affected owners and the 
dummy variable for 2003 continues to have a positive and significant sign. The first 
column of Table 8 therefore lends further support for firm-level dividend policy 
adjustments being affected by dividend clienteles.  
The second stage of the left-hand-side regression shows results for share repurchases, 
which are generally consistent with findings reported in Table 5. Share repurchases 
increase in 2004, while the tax interaction variable continues to be negative but 
insignificant.  
Finally, results of the last stage of our 3SLS analysis show that owners affected by the tax 
reform concentrate in smaller firms with higher dividend payouts, and higher market-to-
book ratios. The result is particularly strong for the payout ratio (a z-statistic in excess of 
5.6), which appears to be the most important determinant of ownership clienteles. As 
individual investors were one of the main investor groups affected by the reform so that 
their presence is captured to a large extent with the TAXED OWNERS variable, our 
findings provide at least indirect support for international evidence on individuals 
preferring dividend-paying stocks (e.g. Dong et al 2003, Graham and Kumar 2006).  
 
Stage 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Dependent Var. PAY-OUT REPURCHAS TAXED PAY-OUT REPURCHAS TAXED 
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ES OWNERS ES OWNERS 
Lagged PAY-
OUT 
0.0903   0.0961   
 (5.124)***   (5.427)***   
ROA 0.4005   0.5089   
 (2.021)**   (2.567)**   
lagged ROA 0.3622   (0.471)   
 (1.982)**   (2.581)***   
Y2003 0.0336 0.0023  0.0109 0.0024  
 (-0.189) (-0.364)  (-0.060) (-0.378)  
Y2004 -0.2125 0.0176  -0.2311 0.0175  
 (-1.344) (2.201)**  (-1.444) (2.185)**  
Y2005 -0.0358 0.0121  -0.0522 0.012  
 (-0.227) (-1.495)  (-0.327) (-1.480)  
TAXED 
OWNERS 
1.2039   1.1457   
 (9.503)***   (8.957)***   
TAXED 
OWNERS 
0.2483   0.2628   
x Y2002 (-1.138)   (-1.189)   
TAXED 
OWNERS 
0.3696   0.3859   
x Y2003 (1.718)*   (1.772)*   
PAST RETURN -0.1205   -0.1073   
 (-1.100)   (-0.968)   
SIZE 0.0691 0.0016 -0.0415 0.0724   
 (3.441)*** (-1.298) (-4.176)*** (-1.056)   
FCF 0.0683    0.002 -0.0235 
 (-1.009)    (-1.615) (-2.797)*** 
TAXED 
OWNERS 
 -0.0141   -0.0138  
x (Y2004 + Y2005) (-1.545)   (-1.514)  
LEVERAGE  -0.0143 -0.0549  -0.0139 -0.0457 
  (-1.282) (-0.656)  (-1.247) (-0.541) 
FOREIGN OWN  0.0457   0.0457  
  (3.694)***   (3.689)***  
PAY-OUT   0.2851   0.2739 
   (5.871)***   (5.649)*** 
MKT-TO-BOOK   0.0072   0.0075 
   (2.015)**   (2.070)** 
CONSTANT -0.3203 -0.0074 0.4924 -0.0319 -0.009 0.4308 
 (2.112)** (-1.089) (8.757)*** (-0.246) (-1.326) (8.073)*** 
N 464 464 464 464 464 464 
Table 8. Simultaneous equations. Table displays 3SLS estimation results for three simultaneous equations. The 
sample includes cash distributions referring to accounting years from 2002 to 2005 by all firms listed on the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange (HEX). T-values are reported in parentheses, and ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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In summary, the simultaneous analysis suggests that firms adjust dividends around the 
tax reform, taking into account the tax clienteles. Furthermore, payout policy appears to 
be an important determinant of ownership structure. The interaction between these will 
be further studied in robustness tests in the next section. 
5.4.Robustness tests 
As a robustness test, we re-examine our earlier empirical tests with panel data estimation. 
The results are reported in Table 9. The t-statistics in the table are calculated using firm 
clustered standard errors, as suggested by Petersen (2009). For each set of regressions, we 
have determined with Hausman test whether the random effects or the fixed effects 
model is more appropriate. Results do not markedly differ in any of the regrssions 
between the two techniques, but for brevity, we only report the regressions indicated by 
Hausman test as more appropriate.  For the model with dividend payout as the dependent 
variable, firm fixed effects results are reported in the first two columns of Table 9. The 
two columns differ only in that the second column is run with a balanced panel, whereas 
the first column contains all the firm-year observations that were part of the earlier 
analysis. The most striking difference between these results and those reported in Table 5 
is that TAXED OWNERS enters with a negative and significant sign. In other words, 
when both pre- and post-reform data is included and firm-specific effects are controlled 
for, tax-sensitivity of owners is inversely related to dividend payouts. This may be 
partially explained by the lowered preference for dividends among tax-affected owners 
after the reform. Namely, the indicator variables, especially that for year 2003, indicate 
that in the pre-reform years, tax-sensitive ownership is having a positive effect on 
dividend payouts, which is consistent with our earlier findings, and supports the 
hypothesis that firms with greater ownership share by shareholders who suffered from the 
reform distributed more cash in form of dividends during the run-up to the new law. 
There are no noticeable differences in results between the full data set and the balanced 
panel.  
 




panel full balanced full balanced full balanced 













lagged PAY-OUT 0.0124 -0.2044     
 (0.358) (-3.870)***    
lagged ROA 0.2803 0.3740     
 (1.731)* (1.686)*     
ROA 0.5399 0.5014 0.0051 0.0071   
 (2.362)** (1.991)** (0.682) (0.713)   
Y2003 0.0871 0.0734 0.0057 0.0062   
 (0.394) (0.297) (1.508) (1.273)   
Y2004 -0.0744 0.1005 0.0174 0.0193   
 (-0.315) (0.318) (1.113) (1.030)   
Y2005 -0.0032 0.0272 0.0115 0.0123   
 (-0.012) (0.076) (1.132) (0.987)   
TAXED 
OWNERS 
-0.4922 -0.4317 -0.0028 -0.0056   
 (-
2.044)** 
(-1.703)* (-0.836) (-1.179)   
TAXED 
OWNERS 
0.4622 0.4382     
x Y2002 (1.242) (0.983)     
TAXED 
OWNERS 
0.7451 0.9025     
x Y2003 (2.568)** (2.643)***    
TAXED 
OWNERS 
  -0.0126 -0.0152   
x (Y2004 + Y2005)  (-0.765) (-0.773)   
PAY-OUT     0.0367 0.0538 
     (1.979)** (2.653)*** 
REPURCHASES     -0.5944 -0.8424 
     (-2.332)** (-0.975) 
PAY-OUT     -0.0574 -0.0721 
x (Y2004 + Y2005)    (-2.892)*** (-3.095)*** 
PAST RETURN -0.1852 -0.1539 -0.0093 -0.0104   
 (-1.545) (-1.526) (-1.246) (-1.163)   
SIZE -0.0450 -0.0329 0.0015 0.0014 0.0001 0.0044 
 (-1.262) (-0.914) (1.050) (0.812) (0.008) (0.191) 
MKT-TO-BOOK 0.0053 0.0039 0.0003 0.0003 0.0028 0.0025 
 (1.574) (1.202) (0.917) (0.917) (4.392)*** (3.573)*** 
FCF 0.1300 0.0660 0.0026 0.0018   
 (1.250) (0.888) (1.212) (0.714)   
LEVERAGE -0.1404 -0.2356 -0.0128 -0.0175 0.0481 0.0565 
 (-0.414) (-0.544) (-1.020) (-1.174) (0.422) (0.468) 
FOREIGN OWN -0.1783 -0.5618 0.0325 0.0407   
 (-0.364) (-0.982) (1.335) (1.353)   







(-0.604) (-0.250) (10.563)*** (6.828)*** 
N 464 328 524 444 487 328 
R
2 
0.155 0.206 0.072 0.085 0.081 0.093 
Table displays panel estimation results using the payout ratio, share repurchases to total payout, and the proportion of 
tax-sensitive owners among top 5 shareholders as dependent variables. The sample includes cash distributions referring 
to accounting years from 2002 to 2005 by all firms listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX). The choice between 
random effects model and firm fixed-effect estimations is based on the Hausman test. For the dividend model and the 
ownership model, we exclude extreme PAY-OUT values (> 800%). The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated 
using clustered standard errors, as suggested by Petersen (2009), and ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Hausman test indicates random effects as the more appropriate technique for the share 
repurchase model. In the third and fourth columns of Table 9, we report findings using 
that technique, again for both full sample and a balanced panel. The regression fails to 
detect any statistically significant determinants of share repurchases, as none of our 
explanatory variables enters with a significant coefficient. Even FOREIGN OWN, which 
has a positive and significant effect on share repurchases according to Table 6 results, is 
no longer significant. These results suggest that other firm-variables may exist behind the 
observed share repurchase patterns. Far fewer firms committed share repurchases than 
dividend payments during our sample years, which makes it difficult for a cross-sectional 
regression model to detect statistical patterns behind the behaviour.  
 
Finally, we estimate two firm fixed-effects models with TAXED OWNERSHIP as the 
dependent variable, in columns 5 and 6 of Table 9. Both models indicate that the 
presence of tax-sensitive owners increases with high dividend payouts and decreases with 
high share repurchases (the latter finding is not statistically significant in the balanced 
panel, however). Furthermore, in the years after the reform, payouts have a negative 
effect on ownership by investors who were affected by the law change. The latter finding 
was not statistically significant earlier in Table 7, but now offers added support for the 
connection between ownership structure and the tax treatment of dividends.  
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Overall, the results in Table 9 are very consistent with the findings reported earlier, 
suggesting that firm-level effects that are controlled for in the panel data estimation were 
not driving our earlier results. The connection between ownership structure and dividend 
payouts becomes only stronger in these tests. 
5.5. Extraordinary dividends  
We finally examine firms’ probability to pay extraordinary dividends. In Finland, 
corporate dividends are typically paid in one annual payment. However, a firm can at an 
extraordinary general meeting, obtain a permission to pay out a separate, extraordinary 
dividend. Recall that in Table 5, we considered ordinary dividend payouts separately 
from extraordinary dividends. In a given year, extraordinary dividends are rare in 
Finland. During our sample period, excluding the year 2003, extraordinary dividends 
were paid out in 19 firm-years out of a total sample of 524 (a probability of 3.6%). When 
year 2003 is included, the probability of extraordinary dividends jumps to 9.7%. The 
upcoming reform had a clear impact on extraordinary dividends. The percentage of firms 
paying extraordinary dividends in 2003 was thus 23.9%. Assuming that extraordinary 
dividend payment is a random event that follows a binomial distribution with the overall 
probability of 9.7% as the “success rate”, the probability of getting as many as 32 events 
out of 134 in 2003 is highly significant at the 1% level (with a p-value of 0.0000).  
Table 5 presented evidence of firms whose owners were affected by the tax reform 
altering their payout behaviour regarding regular dividends. In order to explore whether 
firms’ extraordinary dividend payment behaviour was also driven by clientele issues, we 
observe differences in the sub-samples of firms that paid extraordinary dividends in 2003 
and firms that did not. The average value for variable TAXED OWNERS is 67% for 
payees of extraordinary dividends, as compared to 53% for firms not paying 
extraordinary dividends.  The difference between the averages is statistically significant 
at the one percent level (t = 2.96). We conclude that both ordinary dividend payouts and 
extraordinary dividend decisions were affected by the effect of the 2004 tax reform on 




Tax regime changes offer unique opportunities to study how firms as well as investors 
react. We provide evidence on changes in dividend and share repurchase policies, as well 
as changes in large portfolio holdings, around a major dividend tax reform that occurred 
in Finland in 2004. The reform introduced double taxation of corporate income, as after 
it, 70% of dividends are taxable income at the personal level. Among the five largest 
shareholders of each Finnish firm, on average 54% (25% of total equity) were affected 
adversely by the tax reform. We find that firms increased dividends during the last year 
of the old tax system, when dividends were still untaxed at the investor level. This 
behavior was significantly more prevalent in firms where a higher percentage of 
ownership was in hands of shareholders who were negatively affected by the reform. 
After the reform, dividend payouts decline across all firms. We also find a significant 
increase in share repurchases after the reform. 
We also explore the determinants of ownership, and ownership changes. Payout policy 
variables seem to affect ownership structure of Finnish firms, so that investor groups that 
were affected by the reform altered their holdings depending on dividend payouts. 
However, while our evidence on firms’ reaction to the tax reform is strong, we fail to find 
statistically significant evidence of investors doing so.  
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